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Notes
CHANGING CHANNELS IN BROADCAST
REGULATION: LEAVING TELEVISION
ADVERTISING TO CONTAINMENT BY
MARKET FORCES
Despite its authority to regulatebroadcastadvertising,the FederalCommunications Commission haslongfosteredindustryself-regulation by the NationalAssociadon of Broadcasters(NAB). Recently, however, the Justice Departmentchallenged
as a restraintoftrade NAB guidelinesrestrictingthe timing andpresentationof commercials. The NAB has since discardeditsguidelines,leavingregulationoftelevision
advertising to naturalforcesat work in the marketplace. Opponents ofderegulation
have voiced concern that eliminating commercial guidelines will create overcommercialization. This Note examines the utility of "narket discipline" as an effective
regulator of television advertising. It contends that overcommercialization will be
checked by competitive/orcesinherent in the marketplace. The Note identifies cable
television and other newforms of video technology as a source of increasedcompetitionfor conventional television. Observing that viewers are sensitive to excessive
commercialinterruptions,the Note concludes that the threat of an eroding audience
share will deter broadcastersfrom overcommercialization.

INTRODUCTION

"THIS TUBE IS the most awesome godless force in this whole
godless world." So spoke Howard Beale, veteran anchorman
for UBS, the fictional fourth network in the 1976 academy award
winning motion picture Network.' Television is indeed a pervasive force in contemporary society. It is the sole means by which
seven out of every ten Americans receive their information about
the world. 2 But television does more than communicate information-it shapes its vast audience's perceptions of people, places,
4
and events.3 Television has become a powerful persuasive tool.
The Communications Act of 19341 created the Federal Coin1. P. CHAYEVSKY, NETWORK (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. 1976).
2. D. CROSS, MEDIASPEAK 68 (1983).
3. R. FRANK, MESSAGE DIMENSIONS OF TELEVISION NEWS 43 (1973).
4. J. McGINNIS, THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT 28-31 (1969); N. MINOW, EQUAL
TIME 51 (1964). See generally F. MANKIEWICZ & J. SWERDLOW, REMOTE CONTROL: TELEVISION AND THE MANIPULATION OF AMERICAN LIFE 71-91 & 214-43 (1978) (discussing
use of television to shape public opinion and priorities, and to create consumer demand).
5. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-609 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
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munications Commission (FCC),6 granting it broad authority to
regulate broadcasting in the "public convenience, interest, and necessity." 7 This broad language was intended to allow the FCC
flexibility in an area which has proved dynamic since its inception.8 Recently, however, advances in video technology have
opened the traditional broadcast industry to increased competition,9 casting doubt upon the vitality of the Communications Act
and the role of regulation in broadcasting. 10
Despite its broad authority, the FCC has fostered self-regulation of television advertising." Even in its rare attempts to impose formal restrictions on the presentation and timing of
commercials, the FCC has evinced continued deference to the
guidelines imposed by the National Association of Broadcasters
(NAB), a trade association of television broadcasters.' 2
In June 1979, the Justice Department sued the NAB' 3 for alleged antitrust violations stemming from advertising standards in
its Television Broadcast Code (NAB Code or the Code).' 4 The
6. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
7. Id. § 303. Sections 307, 309, and 310 refer to the Commission's licensing powers.
8. Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 969, recon. grantedin part, 87 F.C.C.2d
797 (198 1), afj'din part,remandedin partsub nom. Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943) (in fight of broadcasting's dynamic nature,
Congress conferred expansive powers on the Commission).
9. See generaly NATIONAL ASS'N OF BROADCASTERS, NEW TECHNOLOGIES AFFECTING RADIO AND TELEVISION (1981) (documenting this trend).

10. Advocates of modernizing the Act have indicated that cable television has raised
issues which render the Act obsolete. Furthermore, the Act offers no guidance for treating
computer-assisted communications. See, e.g., Robinson, The FederalCommunicationsCommission, in COMMUNICATIONS FOR TOMORROW 353, 358-59 (G. Robinson ed. 1978);
Berman, Computer Communications? Allocation of Functions and the Role of the Federal
Communications Commission, 27 FED. COM. L.J. 161 (1974).
11. See, e.g., Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 13-14
(1974) aff'dsub nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 480-81 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
12. Note, The Limits of Broadcast Self-Regulation Under the First Amendment, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1527, 1550 (1975); see, e.g., Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 13 (1974) (praising industry self-regulation and citing NAB's "responsive and responsible attitude ... toward [its] public service obligations," FCC defers to
NAB guidelines for advertising levels on children's programs), a 'd snb nom. Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also E. KRASNOW, L.
LONGLEY & H. TERRY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 193-96 (3d ed. 1982)
(chronicling FCC debate over adopting NAB Code).
13. United States v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C. 1982)
(filed June 14, 1979).
14. NATIONAL ASS'N OF BROADCASTERS, TELEVISION CODE (22d ed. 1981) (pertinent

provisions reprintedin United States v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 1982-83 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 65,049, at 70,846 app. A (D.D.C. 1982) (consent decree)) [hereinafter cited as
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suit assailed those Code provisions which limited the amount of
commercial material to be broadcast each hour, 5 the number of
commercial interruptions per program, 6 the number of consecutive announcements per interruption,' 7 and the number of products to be advertised within a single commercial.'" District Judge
Harold Greene granted summary judgment for the government,
ruling that the multiple product standard was a per se violation of
the Sherman Act.' 9 The court reserved determination on the
Code's time and program interruption standards, however, finding
issues of material fact which could only be resolved at trial.2" One
week after the district court decision, the NAB suspended enforcement of all advertising provisions in its Code.2 ' By consent decree
entered in November 1982, the NAB was enjoined from maintainNAB CODE]. The petition alleged that three of the Code's advertising standards violated
the Sherman Act by restricting the supply of advertising time. 536 F. Supp. at 153. See
infra notes 112-48 and accompanying text.
15. The time standards mandated that network-affiliated stations not exceed 9 minutes of commercial time per hour during "prime time" (plus an extra 30 seconds for promotional announcements), and 16 minutes per hour during the rest of the broadcast day. NAB
CODE, supra note 14, §§ 14.2.A(1), 14.2.B. Independent stations were allowed 7 minutes of
commercial time per 30-minute period during prime time and 8 minutes during all other
30-minute periods. Id. § 15.2. The Code defined prime time as "three consecutive hours
per broadcast day.., between. . . 6:00 p.m. and midnight." Id. §§ 14.2.A(1), 15.2.
The FCC adopted guidelines resembling the Code's time standards. These guidelines
prescribe 16 minutes of commercial time per hour as a maximum. 47 C.F.R. § 0.283(a)(6)
(1982) (repealed 1984).
16. The Code's program interruption standards prohibited network affiliated stations
from interrupting prime time programs more than four times per hour and all other programs more than four times per half-hour. NAB CODE, supra note 14, §§ 14.4(B), 14.4(C).
17. The Code permitted no more than four consecutive announcements per station
break. Id. § 14.5.
18. The multiple product standard proscribed the advertisement of "two or more
products or services within ... a single announcement" if the announcement was less than
60 seconds long. Id. § 9.5. The multiple product standard did not apply to commercials
that were "integrated so as to appear to the viewer as a single message." 536 F. Supp. at
159 n.39.
19. 536 F. Supp. at 159-62. By requiring advertisers to purchase at least 60 seconds of
time to promote more than one product, the multiple product standard could force advertisers to purchase more time than they might otherwise demand. Id. at 160. The net result
is to increase demand for commercial time artificially, thereby raising the price of commercial time and enhancing the broadcasters' revenues. Id. at 160-61.
20. Id. at 159. The court noted that the broadcasting-industry possesses unique characteristics which make application of the per se rules inappropriate: spectrum scarcity,
physical time limitations on its product, and government regulation. Id. at 156. But see
Fowler & Brenner, A MarketplaceApproach to BroadcastRegulation, 60 TEx. L. REv. 207,
221-26 (1982) (discussing several flaws in scarcity argument, including its failure to account for "over-the-air" video substitutes such as cable television and direct broadcast
satellites (DBS)).
21. BROADCASTING. Mar. 15. 1982. at 45.
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ing, promulgating, publishing, distributing, enforcing, monitoring,
or suggesting adherence to the disputed provisions. 22 The NAB
23
has subsequently discarded its entire Code.
With the Code's suspension, regulation of television advertising is essentially left to natural forces at work in the marketplace.24 The only remaining guidelines are those of individual
television stations and station groups.2 5 Opponents of deregulation have voiced concern that eliminating commercial guidelines
will create overcommercialization 6 in contravention of the public
interest.2 ' Advocates of deregulation, however, have insisted that
competitive forces inherent in the marketplace will effectively
check overcommercialization.2 8 "Market discipline," they contend, will better serve the public interest than government
regulation. 9
3 ° appears
United States v. NationalAssociation ofBroadcasters
to signal the demise of self-regulation in the television industry.
At minimum, Judge Greene's opinion lends potent support to the
campaign for broadcast deregulation. 3 ' The result could hardly
have been predicted. Prior to the decision, politicians, indus22. United States v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,049 (D.D.C. 1982). Individual stations should benefit from this settlement, since many
could have been sued for adherence to Code standards. Interview with Erwin G. Krasnow,
formerly General Counsel for the NAB, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 19, 1982); see also
BROADCASTING, Mar. 15, 1982, at 46.
23. BROADCASTING, Jan. 10, 1983, at 37.
24. See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
25. TELEVISION/RADIO AGE, Feb. 14, 1983, at 54-55.
26. See Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 1004 recon. granted in part, 87
F.C.C.2d 797 (1981) aff'd in part, remanded in part sub nom. Office of Communication of
the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (eliminating commercial guidelines in radio industry). But see id. at 1094-98 app. G (offering market theories
refuting overcommercialization argument).
27. See NationalAss'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149, 166 (D.D.C. 1982) (NAB
argued that preventing overcommercialization is in public interest).
28. See Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d at 1004-08. In FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S.
582, 597-99, 601-03 (1981), the Supreme Court endorsed the FCC's discretion to rely on
market forces as a means of ensuring that licensees satisfy the public interest. The WNCN
Court upheld a 1976 FCC Policy Statement defining the FCC's role in reviewing format
changes as consistent with the legislative history of the Communications Act. Id. at
597-604. The Statement had concluded that the public interest in diversity of broadcast
formats is best promoted by reliance on market forces. See Changes in the Entertainment
Formats of Broadcast Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d 858, 863-66 (1976), recon denied, 66 F.C.C.2d
78 (1977).
29. See NationalAss'n o/Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. at 166-68; Fowler & Brenner,
supra note 20, at 210, 230-36.
30. 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C. 1982).
31. A vocal supporter of deregulation is current FCC Chairman Mark Fowler.
BROADCASTING, Oct. 25, 1982, at 23; see Fowler & Brenner, supra note 20.
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try officials, FCC regulators, and members of the public uniformly
supported industry-imposed restrictions on television
advertising.3"
Repeal of the NAB Code, together with the FCC's recent
moves to deregulate commercial radio broadcasting 33 and television, 34 heralds a new era for the electronic mass media.35 Histori32. See, e.g., M. BOTEIN & D. RICE, NETWORK TELEVISION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 16 (1980); Note, supra note 12, at 1550-53 (1975); TELEVISION/RADIO AGE, Feb. 14,
1983, at 85; BROADCASTING, June 25, 1979, at 29; Brown, Antitrust Action on TV Commercials: Industry andAdmen Fear an Exercise in Futility, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1979, at 46,
col. 1.
In 1964, while declining to adopt the NAB Code's advertising standards, the FCC conceded that the "industry-formulated code of good practice in this field ... does serve as
Commercial Advertising Standards, 36 F.C.C. 45, 50
one appropriate limitation .
(1964).
33. Deregulation of Radio, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,888, 13,900-06 (1981); see Radio, 84
F.C.C.2d 968. In effecting deregulation, the Commission abandoned its commercial time
guidelines, and its rules requiring maintenance of comprehensive program logs, ascertainment of community needs, and conformance with nonentertainment programming guidelines. Id. at 971.
34. The FCC proposed deregulation of television. See Deregulation of Television, 48
Fed. Reg. 37,239 (1983) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 0 and 73 (proposed Aug. 4, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Deregulation of Television]. The proposal contained two options for
the elimination of commercial guidelines. Id. at 37,249-50. The first eliminates consideration of a broadcaster's commercial load in license renewal proceedings. This option is
premised on the assumption that marketplace variables will serve as effective regulators of
commercialization. Id. at 37,249; see infra notes 158-216 and accompanying text. The
second option amends current guidelines to allow broadcasters more discretion in commercial loading and airing. The FCC has suggested that either option would allow licensees
freedom to experiment with "new or unconventional commercial techniques." Deregulation of Television, supra, at 37,249. The proposal also considers the present and future
television marketplace, and assesses the potential impact of "those technologies that may
provide genuine substitutes in the viewer's mind for regular television broadcasting [and]
the extent of competition within a narrowly defined over-the-air television submarket." Id.
at 37,243 (emphasis added).
Effective September 24, 1984, the FCC eliminated its requirement that broadcasters
schedule no more than 16 minutes of commercials per hour, thus choosing to implement
the first option proposed in Deregulation of Television. See 49 Fed. Reg. 33,588, 33,598-99
(1984) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 0 & 73) [hereinafter cited as Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies]; see also Burnham, FC C. Relaxes Rules Covering
Broadcast TV, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1984, at 24, col. 1 (the decision "removes an unnecessary layer of Government involvement in the television program decisions of the American

people").
The Commission's decision has met with mixed reactions. Broadcasters generally have
agreed that eliminating commercial guidelines is desirable. 'BROADCASTING, Nov. 28, 1973,
at 29. The consensus among broadcast executives is that the decision will have little practical effect on their operations. Berger, 2 Networks Doubt Ruling Will Spur Commercials,
N.Y. Times, June 28, 1984, at 24, col. 2; BROADCASTING, July 2, 1984, at 31 (group broadcast owners surveyed do not intend "to expand commercial inventories"). Advertising executives also believe that the FCC decision will not result in a flood of commercials as
"'stations are businessmen and they would recognize that when the number of commercials becomes so great, viewers are irritated or antagonized.'" Berger, supra. Television
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cally, the broadcast licensee has occupied the role of public
trustee,36 granted an exclusive privilege to use a limited resource. 37 Although spectrum scarcity is no longer a realistic justification for regulation, television remains subject to an "absolute
physical limitation on its product [since] there are. . . only sixty
minutes to each hour.

38

This Note explores how elimination of self-regulatory advertising standards will affect commercial television. It considers the
historical background of broadcast industry regulation39 and selfregulation under the NAB Code.4 ° With particular attention to
the Code's advertising standards, and in light of the competitive
nature of commercial television, the Note examines the utility of
market discipline as an effective regulator of television advertising. 41 It concludes that natural market variables such as audience,
advertisers, and new technology should effectively contain the
threat of overcommercialization.4 2
executives have voiced their concern that overcommercialization could result in a decreased viewing audience. "'It would be dangerous to expand commercial time. The
viewer tolerance level for advertising per hour is at its highest, at a dangerous level, right
now. To go higher would be extremely foolhardy."' Id.; BROADCASTING, July 2, 1984, at
31 (" 'If there are too many commercials, people [will] stop watching television' "); see also
Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, 49 Fed. Reg. at 33,598-99 (citing viewing audiences' likely avoidance of stations which overcommercialize).
35. Congress is currently considering legislation to deregulate broadcasting. See S.
1609, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 3158-64 (1982). The bill passed the Senate but
died in the House, and was reintroduced by Senator Goldwater. See S.55, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 1289-93 (1983). It codifies many of the FCC's proposals for radio
and television deregulation, including elimination of comparative renewal proceedings for
licensees, id. at 1291, and limits on radio commercials. Id. at 1292. Other bills on broadcast deregulation are pending in the House of Representatives. See CONG. Q., Jan. 21,
1984, at 93.
36. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 20, at 213-17.
37. Justice Frankfurter used this "scarcity" rationale to support his view of broadcasters as fiduciaries of the public. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943). But
the explosive growth of cable and other substitutes for over-the-air television broadcasting
has prompted modem commentators to denounce the scarcity rationale as "flawed" and
"antiquated." See, e.g., Fowler & Brenner, supra note 20, at 221-26; Robinson, supra note
10, at 358-59.
38. 536 F. Supp. at 156.
39. See infra notes 43-82 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 158-216 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 217-225 and accompanying text.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENTS IN
TELEVISION BROADCAST REGULATION

Television regulation has always generated controversy.43 In

1960, criticizing the medium as a "vast wasteland," Chairman
Newton Minow urged the FCC to play a more active regulatory
role.'

Recently, however, deregulation has been urged, partly on

the assumption that increased competition will provide effective
regulatory control.4 This section of the Note traces the history of

broadcast regulation, with particular emphasis on the efforts of the
FCC and NAB.
A.

The Federal Communications Commission

1. Statutory History

Federal regulation of broadcasting originated in 1910 with the
Wireless Ship Act.4 6 Two years later, Congress enacted the Radio
Act of 19 12, 47 the first comprehensive regulatory scheme for radio.
Hampered by insufficient guidelines and authority, the government failed to contain radio's unprecedented growth and the re-

sulting frequency "free-for-all" of the 1920's.48 Finally,
responding to fifteen years of inadequate regulation, Congress
43. See E. KRASNOW, L. LONGLEY & H. TERRY, supra note 12, at 19-25.
44. Minow Observes a Vast Wasteland, BROADCASTING, May 15, 1960, at 58-59. See
generally N. MINow, supra note 4, at 48-64 (text of Chairman Minow's address to 39th
Convention of NAB in Washington, D.C., May 9, 1960).
45. Brown, The FCC Proudly Presents the Vast Wasteland, CHANNELS, Mar./Apr.
1983, at 27.
46. Ch. 379, 36 Stat. 629 (repealed 1934). The Wireless Ship Act protected ships at sea
by requiring two-way radio capability of any ship licensed to carry 50 or more persons
before permission could be granted to leave an American port. Id. § 1, 36 Stat. at 629-30.
Enforcement power vested in the Department of Commerce and Labor. Id. § 4, 36 Stat. at
630. The Act contained no specific provisions governing broadcasting and lacked any reference to licenses or wavelengths.
47. Ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed 1927). The Radio Act established call letters for
government radio stations, assigned frequencies, and required that radio operators obtain
licenses from the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. See J. BITTNER, BROADCAST LAW
AND REGULATION 5-7 (1982).
48. J. BITTNER, supra note 47, at 7; see 1 E. BARNOUW, A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES: A TOWER IN BABEL 94-122 (1966).
In 1922, Secretary of Commerce and Labor Herbert Hoover called the First National
Radio Conference, which concluded unanimously that increased federal control over allocation and use of frequencies was essential to prevent chaos and interference. J. BiTTNER,
supra note 47, at 7-8. Hoover's attempt to reduce interference by controlling the number
of licensees was thwarted by the courts. See Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003
(D.C. Cir. 1923) (authorizing Secretary to allocate frequencies but not to deny licenses);
United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926) (denying Secretary power
to impose restrictions on frequency, power, and hours of operation).
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passed the Radio Act of 192741 to save the industry from selfdestruction.
The 1927 Act contained the first codification of the public interest standard 5° which was to become the cornerstone of broadcast regulation. The newly created Federal Radio Commission
addressed advertising abuse and excess in an early interpretation
of the public interest standard.' Returning to the subject in 1929,
the Commission observed that advertising, as the primary source
of revenue to the licensee, required close scrutiny to ensure protec52
tion of the public interest.
The growing public use of radio eventually demanded coordinated broadcast regulation by a single agency. Therefore, Congress passed the Communications Act of 1934,53 which created the
Federal Communications Commission, an independent agency
headed by seven commissioners. The 1934 Act delegated broad
powers to the FCC to regulate broadcasting in the "public convenience, interest or necessity."' 54 Through its licensing authority,
the FCC polices for compliance with the public interest standard." The Supreme Court has interpreted the Commission's ex49. Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934). The Act established the Federal Radio
Commission to oversee broadcasting, id. § 3, 44 Stat. at 1162. The Commission was empowered to assign wavelengths to licensees and to designate the power and location of
transmitters. Id. § 4, 44 Stat. at 1163.
50. The Act gave the Commission power to grant licenses for three-year terms in the
"public convenience, interest or necessity." Id. § 9, 44 Stat. at 1166; see R. NOLL, M. PECK
& J. McGOWAN, ECONoMIc ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 98 (1973).
51. See Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 1002 n.69, recon. granted inpart, 87
F.C.C.2d 797 (1981), aff'd in part, remandedin part sub nom. Office of Communication of
the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
52. See id. at 1105 n.48 app. G (chronicling early cases). Advertising is commercial
television's major revenue source as well. J. BITTNER, supra note 47, at 236; Gf. R. NOLL,
M. PECK & J. McGOWAN, supra note 50, at 33-44 (economic analysis of advertiser-supported television).
53. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)). Title III of the Act confers express authority on the FCC to regulate all
aspects of radio and television broadcasting. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
Cable television, however, has been deemed to fall beyond the scope of the Commission's
Title III authority. Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 255 (1958). But see
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (FCC may exercise jurisdiction over areas not directly subject to regulation under Titles II (common carrier) and III).
54. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303,307,309 & 310(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981);seesupra note 8 and
accompanying text. The rapid growth and development in television and video technology-including cable, DBS, and low-power television-will require a flexible interpretation of the Act. See infra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
55. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), 309(a) & 310(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Licensing authority is the distinctive feature of broadcast regulation under the 1934 Act. See 2 E.
BARNOuW, A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES: THE GOLDEN WEB

28-32 (1968). Through licensing, the FCC has controlled access to the limited number of
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pansive jurisdiction to include cable as well as broadcast
television.5 6
2. Public Interest in Diversity: The Trustee Approach
Courts have repeatedly affirmed that diverse broadcast programming is in the public interest.57 This view was reflected in the
first edition of the Blue Book,5 8 the FCC's definitive policy statement regarding factors relevant to the public interest.5 9 The Commission considered such factors upon review of both new and
renewal license applicants.6" The Commission thus employed its
licensing powers to promote balanced program formats-furthering its view of the licensee as public trustee.6 '
spectrum positions. Id.; see also I E. BARNOUW, SUpra note 48, at 214-19 (discussing regulation by Federal Radio Commission). Currently, television licenses are granted for terms
of up to five years, and are renewable at the FCC's discretion. 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
56. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (FCC possesses
regulatory authority over cable television as instrument of interstate communication under
§ 152(a) of Communications Act); see United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649,
662-70 (1972) (applying Southwestern to find that FCC may regulate cable television if
exercise of authority is "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of [its] various
responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting"). See generally Note, FCC
Authority Over Cable Television, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 962, 964-72 (discussing implied jurisdiction over cable television based on ancillary jurisdiction under § 152(a)).
57. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 594-99 (1981) (supporting
FCC's ruling to promote diverse programming); see also Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v.
FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971) (upholding regulation of network-syndicated programs
as fostering market for independent programming); FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 793-97 (1978) (divesting commonly owned radio stations and
newspapers to promote diverse programming in public interest).
58. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF
BROADCAST LICENSEES (C. Sterling ed. 1946) [hereinafter cited as Blue Book]. The Blue
Book comprehensively interpreted the public interest standard as applied to program service, prescribing a detailed review of the advertising aired by individual stations while
encouraging industry self-regulation. Id. at 56; see Ramey, The FederalCommunications
Commission and BroadcastAdvertising: AnAnalyicalReview, 20 FED. COM. L.J. 71, 83-85
(1966).
59. The public interest factors included noncommercial programming, local live programs, programs devoted to public issues, and the elimination of excess advertising. Blue
Book, supra note 58, at 56. While acknowledging the importance of advertising as a means
of disseminating information to consumers, the Commission recognized that the public
interest requires a reasonable relation between advertising time and programming time.
60. Before considering the public interest factors, the FCC was required to balance
the public interest in program diversity against the broadcaster's first amendment rights.
National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 207-08 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
61. Despite the Blue Book and the NAB Code, advertising regulation continued to
pose major problems for the FCC. See generally Ramey, supra note 58, at 88-94 (describing problems and FCC responses). In 1957, the FCC established a formal liaison with the
Federal Trade Commission to prevent deceptive advertising. Liaison Between FCC &
FTC Relating to False Misleading Radio & Television Advertising, 22 F.C.C. 1572 (1957);
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In 1960, the FCC reaffirmed this view. 62 It repealed its Blue
Book requirement for noncommercial programming, 63 while adding a requirement that licensees ascertain and serve diverse com-

munity programming needs.64

By placing programming

responsibility on the licensee-including responsibility for quantity and frequency of advertising-the FCC encouraged industry

self-regulation in accordance with its trustee philosophy.65
3.

Overcommercialization

Since the inception of broadcast regulation, the FCC has
maintained that excess commercialization contravenes the public
interest.6 6 While advertising dollars may constitute the lifeblood
of commercial broadcasting, the Commission nevertheless must
"ensure that the 'public interest' does not become subordinate to

financial and commercial interests.

67

Yet it has imposed only the

most limited restraints on quantitative aspects of broadcast advertising.68 Moreover, it has hesitated to regulate the content of commercials, due to first amendment considerations and fear of
see Ramey, supra note 58, at 92-93. See generally Comment, FTC Deceptive Advertising
Regulation: A Proposaiforthe Use of Consumer BehaviorResearch, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 946
(1982) (discussing FTC responses to deceptive advertising). The FCC's general policy,
however, has been to avoid content-based review of alleged deceptive advertising and to
refer all such complaints to the FTC. See Adoption of Standards Designed to Eliminate
Deceptive Advertising from Television, 32 F.C.C.2d 360, 405 (1971).
62. En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960).
63. Id. at 2314-16.
64. Id. at 2313-14. The Commissions made the licensee accountable "for allmaterial
...broadcast through [its] facilities .... In the fulfillment of his obligation the broadcaster should consider the tastes, needs and desires of the public he is licensed to serve in
developing his programming. . .[and] carry them out as well as he reasonably can." Id.
The Inquiry enumerated 14 major elements of program material to guide the licensee in
satisfying the "public interest, needs and desires of the community":
(1)opportunity for local self-expression, (2) development and use of local talent, (3) children's programs, (4) religious programs, (5) educational programs, (6) public affairs programs, (7) editorials by licensees, (8) political broadcasts, (9) agricultural programs, (10)
news programs, (11) weather and market reports, (12) sports programs, (13) service to minority groups, and (14) entertainment programs. Id. at 2314.
8316 Before a Subcomm. of
65. Id.; see BroadcastAdvertisements: Hearingson H
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 162 (1963).
66. See Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 1000-02, recon. granted in part, 87
F.C.C.2d 797 (1981), af'din part,remanded in part sub nom. Office of Communication of
the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
67. Children's Television Report & Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 9 (1974), aff'dsub
nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
68. The FCC has confined its action to modest regulation of commercial time. See 47
C.F.R. § 0.283(a)(6) (1982) (prescribing maximum of 16 minutes of commercial time per
hour); supra note 15.

1984]

CHANGING CHA.NNELS IN BRoADCAST REGUL4TION

475

violating the Communications Act's anticensorship provision.6 9
Thus, the Commission has left content-based decisionmaking to
the courts, the networks, the NAB, and other government

agencies.7 °
Until 1981, the FCC limited the amount and frequency of
commercial matter to be broadcast during an hour of radio. 71 After extensive economic analysis and empirical research, and an exhaustive consideration of the history of advertising guidelines, the
FCC chose to eliminate all restrictions on the amount of commer72
cial time.
Proponents of deregulation contend that competition in an unbiased market will prevent overcommercialization. 73 They argue
that the intense competition in the radio market is a sufficient deterrent to overcommercialization, since "it is simply too easy for
the public to turn the dial."'74 In its comments supporting the
FCC's deregulation proposal, the NAB observed that commercial
clutter reduces the effectiveness of individual ads. 75 Competition
69. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
70. Qualitative aspects of advertising which have prompted intervention include false
advertising, deceptive trade practices, and consumer fraud; content-based challenges have
frequently involved advertisements for food, alcoholic beverages, and cosmetics. J. BrrrNER, supra note 47, at 236. Perhaps the most significant government action regarding advertising content is the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89- 92,
79 Stat. 282 (1965) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1982)). This Act proscribes
cigarette advertising "on any medium of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the [FCC]." 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982). The Supreme Court upheld the Act's constitutionality in NAB v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 100 (1972). For a summary of judicial and
congressional reaction to other problems involving advertising content, see J. BrrrNER,
supra note 47, at 233-46; R. ELLMORE, BROADCAsTING LAW AND REGULATION 218-40
(1982).
71. See Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d at 971.
72. Id. Responding to fundamental changes in the industry (a vast increase in the
number of stations accompanied by a trend toward specialization), the Commission authorized a study of radio deregulation in October, 1978. Id. at 969. The proposal to abolish restrictions on commercial time received strong support from broadcasters, many of
whom indicated that they would comply voluntarily with the guidelines to ensure their
ability to demonstrate satisfactory commercial service upon license renewal. Id. at 1095
app. G.
Broadcasters have argued nonetheless that the regulatory burdens of the guidelines outweigh their effectiveness, and that lifting them would vest ultimate control over advertising
levels with the listener-consumer. In addition, consumer judgments would more quickly be
effected in the marketplace. Id. at 1094-95. Moreover, deregulation might encourage experimental forms of advertising such as program-length commercials as opposed to traditional spots, which could prompt a desirable trend toward more information-oriented ads.
Id. at 1007.
73. Id. at 1004.
74. Id. at 1094 app. G.
75. Id. Clutter is the overconcentration of mesgages (ads) in a continuous block of
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the lis-

tener may stop listening, causing reduced market exposure for the
advertiser, who might then contract with another station, thus creating a smaller audience and fewer advertisers for the original station.76 This scenario has equal, if not greater, application to
television.77 Although the FCC lacks express statutory authority
to consider competition in its decisions,78 "practices which present
realistic dangers of competitive restraint are a proper consideration for the Commission" in determining the public interest, convenience, and necessity.79
The broad language of the Communications Act authorizes
the FCC to promulgate commercial time limits in the public interest.8" The Commission has long acknowledged that excessive advertising poses a threat to the public interest, but nevertheless
chose to encourage industry self-regulation through such policy
statements as the Blue Book.8" Furthermore, the FCC deferred to
the NAB Code as a means of ensuring that broadcasting is pursued in the public interest.8 2
commercial time. Even a single advertisement may lose effectiveness by conveying too
many messages. An efficient ad conveys only two or three impressions to its audience.
Interview with Carey S. Miller, Media Supervisor for the Marschalk Company, in New
York City (Mar. 4, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Miller Interview]. A barrage of impressions
may cause reduced attention levels, less retention, and a consequent decline in the advertiser's appeal. 0. KLEPPNER, ADVERTISING PROCEDURE 127 (8th ed. 1983); see also L.
BOGART, STRATEGY IN ADVERTISING 139-42 (1967) (examples of clutter and comments by
advertising professionals).
76. Empirical research by the United States Department of Commerce, National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) found that "the overwhelming majority of broadcasters [remain] considerably below the guideline during every hour
of operation." Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d at 1101 app. G. Econometric analysis of this data suggested that stations limit their level of advertising to avoid clutter. Id.
77. See Abrams, "Zappers" Switch Off TVAds and Scare Some Media Buyers, Wall
St. J., Oct. 6, 1983, at 33, col. 1 (" 'Zapping' describes the switching of channels during
commercials, typically by a remote-control device or a cable TV selector within a viewer's
reach.").
78. See Shuman, The Application of the Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries, 44
TENN. L. REV. 1, 45 (1976).
79. General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 857 (5th Cir. 1971). For a discussion of the applicability of antitrust law to the broadcast industry, see infra notes 149-57
and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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The NationalAssociation of Broadcasters

1. HistoricalDevelopment
The NAB is a powerful lobbying force in broadcast regula-

tion.83 According to its by-laws, the NAB was founded to "promote development of the arts of aural and visual broadcasting
•.

.

; to protect its members. . .from injustices.

.

.[and] to en-

courage and promote customs and practices which will strengthen
and maintain the broadcasting industry to the end that it may best
serve the public."84 Since its inception, it has grown to include
over 690 member television stations and the three major networks.85 The NAB has worked closely with broadcasters and the
FCC to develop a regulatory scheme which guards the public in-

terest while avoiding cumbersome restrictions on broadcasters.
This dual function was the goal of the NAB Code.
2. The NAB Television Code
In 1952, the NAB promulgated its first Television Code,8 6 con-

sisting of guidelines to help broadcasters meet their statutory obligation to operate in the public interest. Essentially a selfregulatory version of the Blue Book," the NAB Code urged tele-

casters to scrutinize the quality of advertising aired by their stations.88 The NAB Code has undergone twenty-one revisions since
83. Broadcasters formed the NAB in 1923 to oppose charges by the American Society
of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) that broadcasting music over the radio
constituted a copyright infringement. J. BrrTNE, supra note 47, at 353; Mackey, The Development of the NationalAssociation of Broadcasters, 1 J. BROADCASTING 305 (1957); see
Hearingson S.2600 Be/ore a Subcomn of the Senate Comm on Patents, 68th Cong., 1st

Sess. 1-50 (1924).
84. NATIONAL Ass'N OF BROADCASTERS, BY-LAWS art. II, reprintedin J.BrrrNER,
supra note 47, at 354-55.
85. NAB NEws, Jan. 20, 1983, at 30. This group comprises 67% of American television stations, reaching roughly 85% of all viewers. NATIONAL AsS'N OF BROADCASTERS,
LEGAL GUIDE TO FCC BROADCAST RULES, REGULATIONS, AND POLICIES ch.4, at 2 (1977)

[hereinafter cited as NAB

LEGAL GUIDE].

86. The NAB approved its initial formulation of self-regulatory standards in 1928,
with various revisions the following year. Pridgen & Engel, Advertising andMarketingon
Cable Televisiorn Whither the Public Interest?, 31 CATH. U.L. Rnv. 227, 247 (1982). The
provisions of the NAB Radio Code were applied to television in its early years, but by 1950
the NAB had decided that a separate code was needed to accommodate the visual qualities
of television. TVStandardrs NAB to Set Up Code Unit, BROADCASTING, May 1, 1950, at
50. The first edition of the NAB Television Code, which took effect on March 1, 1952,
utilized the basic language of the Radio Code, but contained more references to licensee
responsibility. Note, supra note 12, at 1529 n.13.
87. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
88. Beatty, Stringent TV Code, BROADCASTING, OcL 22, 1951, at 23, 32.
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its enactment. 9 Adverse antitrust litigation commenced in 1979,90
however, prompted the NAB to suspend its Code 9' and dissolve
its Code Boards. 92

Subscription to the Television Code was voluntary and open
to all stations.93 By 1978, Code subscribers totaled nearly sixtyseven percent of all television stations in the United States.9 4

Each station was monitored semiannually for Code compliance,
and subscribers who violated a Code provision were subject to
suspension. 95 Once suspended, a station could no longer display
the NAB Television Seal of Good Practice. 96 Administrative re-

sponsibility vested in a nine-member Television Code Board, representing the three major networks and management from
individual subscriber stations. 97

While the Communications Act has for fifty years provided
authority for FCC regulation of broadcasting, industry self-regulation by the NAB has long been the norm in television. With
approval from broadcasters, advertisers, and the FCC, the NAB

Code effectively protected the public interest while obviating government intrusion. The Justice Department's antitrust challenge,
however, has cast doubt upon the future of self-regulation in the

television industry.98
89. See supra note 14.

90. See United States v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C.
1982).
91. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
92. NAB NEws, Jan. 20, 1983, at 30. The NAB resolution cited the uncertain future
of broadcast self-regulation in the wake of the antitrust suit, and the prior suspension of the
NAB's Advertising Standards. Id. Nevertheless, the NAB has refused to accept these signals as the death of self-regulation and is considering lobbying Congress for an antitrust
exemption to permit it to implement new codes. BROADCASTING, Jan. 10, 1983, at 37.
93. NAB CODE, supra note 14, § 3.1.
94. NAB LEoAL GUID, supra note 85, ch. 4, at 2.
95. NAB CODE, supra note 14, §§ 3.4, 7. A member could be suspended by a twothirds vote of the NAB Television Board of Directors. Id. § 3A.
96. Id. The standard for suspension was "continuing, willful or gross violation." Id.
Commentators have labeled the penalty "trifling." See Levin, The Limits of Self-Regulation, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 603, 637 (1967); Note, supra note 12, at 1531. This view may have
stemmed from the NAB's infrequent exercise of its suspension authority. Pridgen & Engel,
supra note 86, at 250-51.
97. J. BrrrINER, supra note 47, at 362. The NAB Code Authority was responsible for
enforcing Code provisions and monitoring compliance. See United States v. National
Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149, 153 (D.D.C. 1982). The Code Authority also
issued interpretive advertising guidelines to subscribers and published a monthly newsletter. R. ELLMORE, supra note 70, at 263-64.
98. See supra notes 13-35 and accompanying text. Alberto-Culver Co. recently filed a
class action against the NAB, station group owners, and the three major networks on behalf of purchasers of television advertising time. Alberto-Culver Co. v. National Ass'n of
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ANTITRUST PROBLEMS IN TELEVISION ADVERTISING
REGULATION

Advertising is a slanted process by nature. 99 Its function is not
merely to inform consumers about a product or service but to
highlight the most appealing characteristics,"° often in a flamboyant or surreal manner, 01 with the goal of persuading the public to
purchase.'
Advertising has developed into a sophisticated art,
utilizing advanced communication techniques 0 3 and market reBroadcasters, No. 83-3427 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 17, 1983); see infra note 147 and accompanying text. On March 12, 1984, it dismissed the suit against most defendants, who dropped
restrictions on split 30-second commercials. BROADCASTING, Mar. 19, 1984, at 42.
99. As one advertising professional has explained:
Advertising may function (1) as a reminder of a product, (2) as a source of information about a product, (3) as an argument on behalf of a product, (4) as a stimulus to create an emotional climate auspicious to a product, or (5) as a means of
establishing an aura or image of a product.
L. BOGART, supra note 75, at 127.
100. "Effective advertising consists of making the right promise to the right audience
....
All you have to do is find the desired benefit that your product is capable of delivering and then zero in on those who are most likely to gain the greatest advantage from this

benefit." D.

MALICKSON &

J.

NASON, ADVERTISING--HoW TO WRITE THE KIND THAT

WORKS 58 (2d ed. 1982). The classic formula for an effective ad is represented by the
acronym "AIDA," which translates: Attention, Interest, Desire, Action. Id. at 75-76; M.
RAY, ADVERTISING AND COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT 43-44 (1982); see also id. at
234-64 (advertising employs appeals to consumer goals and needs to enhance attractiveness of products); L. BOGART, supra note 75, at 13 (advertising aims to catalogue attributes
of product and inform consumers of its virtues); Capitam, The Selling ofthe American Public, in ADVERTISING'S ROLE IN SOCIETY 143 (1974) ("Advertising involves the manipulation of symbols; its intention is to affect social perceptions and individual behavior.").
101. Advertising often "moves away from the product and into pure gimmickry in order to break through the barrier of inattention." L. BOGART, supra note 75, at 142.
When once we look at these appeals coldly and objectively, when once we question their meaning and value, many of them appear monstrous or ridiculous. But
the fatuous, absurd, and exaggerated symbols through which some advertisers
metaphorically proclaim the virtues of their products are rarely a subject of dispassionate examination by the average citizen of contemporary America. They
are accepted as part of the landscape. Does anyone really believe that "Us
Tareyton Smokers Would Rather Fight Than Switch"? Of course not; yet no one
is indignant at this widely proclaimed statement, because no one assumes it is to
be taken at face value.
Id. at 6.
102. The ultimate purpose of most advertising is to sell. Id. at 13. Advertising performs two significant functions for business: arousing in consumers the desire to buy a new
product, and communicating logical and/or emotional reasons for chosing the advertised
product over the competitor's. Mortimer, Advertising: An IntegralFunction of Business, in
ADVERTISING'S ROLE IN SOCIETY, supra note 100, at 167; see D. MALICKSON & J. NASON,
supra note 100, at 58; see also M. RAY, supra note 100, at 250-64 (use of emotional, competitive, and credibility appeals to persuade consumers to buy); id. at 308-14 (using honesty, repetition, or fear as stimulus).
103. See M. RAY, supra note 100, at 46-47 (describing "marketing-communication research system"). These techniques include styling the tone of an ad to appeal to consumer
needs. Id. at 234-64. Irritation, humor, distractions, and testimonials are all commonly
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search"° to maximize the impact of a chosen message. Indeed,

the multi-sensory approach of television advertising has prompted
Judge Bazelon to express concern about its possible effects: "[A]n
ordinary habitual television watcher can avoid these commercials
only by frequently leaving the room, changing the channel, or doing some other such affirmative act. It is difficult to calculate the
[subconscious] impact of thispervasivepropaganda,which may be
heard even if not listened to . . "105
United States v. NationalAssociation of Broadcastersreflects a
conflict between the policies of the antitrust laws and the regulatory goals of the FCC. Both regulatory regimes share the broad

purpose of protecting the public interest, yet their specific objectives are potentially incompatible. Antitrust seeks to promote
competition;10 6 an important goal of the Communications Act is
to prevent excessive commercialization. 0 7 Commentators have
suggested that these goals may become increasingly antagonistic
in the future.'0 8 This section of the Note addresses the problems
such antagonism poses for broadcast regulation.
A.

Code Advertising Standards UnderAttack

The most recent edition of the NAB Code contained two maused to enhance the effectiveness of ads. Id. at 294-316. Analysts carefully study the nature and structure of consumer attitudes so that ads may be tailored to achieve maximum
effectiveness. Id. at 126-30; see also L. BOGART, supra note 75, at 115-42 (advertising
strategists analyze viewer perception, attention span, memory, and symbolic association);
id. at 52-61 (research and assessment of consumer motivation); M. NAPLES, EFFECTIVE
FREQUENCY:

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FREQUENCY AND ADVERTISING EFFECTIVE-

16-24 (1979) (use of psychological learning theory and research).
104. See D. JUGGENHEIMER & P. TURK, ADVERTISING MEDIA 33-44 (1980) (establishing market profiles based on geographic market and competitive product statistics); id. at
45-56 (establishing consumer profiles by using demographics and audience characteristics);
id. at 59-71 (considerations in media planning). Advertising professionals compile various
indexes of data to facilitate assessment and selection of advertising targets. J. SIssoRs & J.
SURMANEK, ADVERTISING MEDIA PLANNING 109-39 (2d ed. 1982). In targeting a specific
type of consumer, advertisers compile data on personalities and buying habits, and utilize
"psychographic analysis." Id. at 110-24. To determine the geographic boundaries of the
target market, advertisers utilize sales analyses of specific product brands and categories in
conjunction with buying power indexes and geographic market data. Id. at 124-36.
105. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (emphasis added), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
106. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
107. See Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 1002, recon. granted in part, 87
F.C.C.2d 797 (1981), afJ'd in part, remandedin part sub nom. Office of Communication of
the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
108. See, e.g., Friedman, ContinuedandSolved." Who Killed the NAB Code?, MADISON
AVE., Aug. 1982, at 42.
NESS
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jor sections: Program Standards and Advertising Standards. °9
Besides providing general guidelines for subscribers, the Advertising Standards banned or restricted specific products and advertising techniques."t0 Many of these provisions corresponded to rules
and policies of the Federal Trade Commission."' The government's antitrust suit challenged as a restraint of trade Code standards fixing time limits for commercials." 2 The NAB's status as
an industry trade association failed to insulate it from antitrust

liability. 113

1. The Time Standards
The Justice Department charged that the NAB Code time
109. The Program Standards include guidelines for the presentation of news, politics,
controversial public issues, community responsibilities, religion, and children's programming. The Advertising Standards contain guidelines pertaining to advertising claims, medical products advertising, contests, premiums, and other offers, as well as general rules
regarding time standards and presentation. See J. BITrNER, supra note 47, at 360.
110. Banned products included distilled spirits (hard liquor), fortune-telling, tip sheets,
and hypnosis. Restrictions included on-camera beer and wine drinking. Proscribed techniques included "bait and switch" (one product is advertised to attract customers but is
unavailable upon a customer's request), program-length commercials, and subliminal advertising. R. ELLMORE, supra note 70, at 262-63; Pridgen & Engel, supra note 86, at
249-50.
I11. See Pridgen & Engel, supra note 86, at 235-37.
112. NationalAss'n of Broadcasters,536 F. Supp. at 152.
113. Id. at 163. While mere membership in a trade association is insufficient to constitute an antitrust violation, an agreement to engage in or adhere to an unlawful practice
may subject the individual members to antitrust liability. Egan, TradeAssociation Counseling: Exercises in Risk Management, 46 BROOKLYN L. REv. 183, 183-84 (1980); see
Bembow, Brown, Burditt & Egan, Contracts with Trade Associations, 49 ANTITRUST L.J.
833, 835-38 (1981). The threat of private suits against NAB members was an influential
factor in the NAB's decision to enter into a consent agreement in the government's suit.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
Although a primary goal of self-regulation is protecting an industry from harming itself, such a scheme may cause "injury to competition which cannot be justified as furthering legitimate self-regulatory ends." Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 358
(1963). Despite previous deference from an administrative agency, a self-regulated industry can run afoul of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (society of engineers' canon of ethics prohibiting members from submitting competitive bids held to be unreasonable trade restraint); Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (bar association rule prescribing minimum fees for
legal services held to violate § 1 of Sherman Act); United States v. National Ass'n of
Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C. 1982) (television industry trade association's selfimposed advertising standards alleged as unlawful restriction on supply of commercial
time); National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965) (agreement
fixing composition of wheat types in macaroni to depress demand for durum wheat constituted unlawful price fixing). Industry-promulgated codes of conduct are particularly suspect as potential restraints on competition. Blecher, Product Standards and Certfcation
Programs, 46 BROOKLYN L. REv. 223, 230-31 (1980).
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standards' 14 were an "artificial manipulation" of the supply of television advertising time." 5 The government maintained that limiting the total amount of commercial time increased advertising

prices.

16

This proposition is based on the assumption that the

traditional supply/price relationship "I exists in the television advertising context. But television possesses characteristics which
interfere with the normal operation of market forces. These include scarcity of broadcast time and frequencies," 8 and government regulation." 9 Acknowledging these characteristics, the
court concluded that the Code's time standards were not necessar20
ily an unlawful limitation on the supply of advertising time.1
Empirical data collected by the Commission showed that a
substantial number of radio stations were broadcasting less adver-

tising than the maximum limits set by the FCC' 2 '--suggesting
that competition in the market actually sets the optimal amount of

advertising time.12 2 This theory appears equally applicable to tel-

evision. 23 Slight increases in the amount of advertising time tend
24
to reduce viewership and the attention devoted to commercials.
Factors augmenting the scarcity concept are the high cost of
television advertising, the existence of only three major networks,
and the questionable cross-elasticity of advertiser demand for television. The cost of advertising on television is staggering,
114. See supra note 15.
115. 536 F. Supp. at 152.
116. d.
117. For a discussion of this relationship and its bearing on antitrust law, see R. PosNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS
4-10 (2d ed. 1981).
118. 536 F. Supp. at 156; see supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. Scarcity of
broadcast time is an absolute physical limitation, 536 F. Supp. at 156 & n.24, but frequency
scarcity is no longer supportable due to technological developments such as cable television
and satellite access. Even the spectrum limitations on UHF signals can be alleviated in
part by bandwidth compression, although this might require consumers to purchase new
receivers. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 20, at 222 n.70; cf.id. at 225 (some existing UHF
channels have remained unclaimed for decades).
119. 536 F. Supp. at 156-57.
120. Id. at 157.
121. Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 1101 app. G, recon granted in part, 87
F.C.C.2d 797 (1981), aff'd in part,remanded in part sub noma.Office of Communication of
the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
122. Id.
123. See Deregulation of Television, supra note 34, at 37,254-55 app. C (FCC staff
study of 60 stations in Florida, Georgia, and Alabama); BROADCASTING, Nov. 28, 1983, at
30 (NAB survey of 240 stations in 60 markets; results were based on FCC data compiled
during license renewal process).
124. R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. MCGOWAN, supra note 50, at 34.
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although it varies widely with the time of day and the specific program. For example, airing a thirty-second commercial during the
1984 Super Bowl cost an advertiser $450,000,125 while the average
price for a thirty-second spot during prime time on ABC is
$91,000.126 The existence of only three major television networks
also restricts the amount of available advertising time. The crosselasticity of demand for television advertising time has been a
subject of debate, 27 but it seems unlikely that any medium could
adequately substitute for television. Marketing executives regard
television as the most effective medium for mass marketing, citing
"an unbeatable combination of 'sight, sound and motion.' "128
Thus, the government may not have been justified in attacking the
NAB Code's time standards as a significant restriction on the supply of advertising time.
2. ProgramInterruption Standards
The Justice Department assailed the Code's program interruption standards 29 as a standardization agreement130 serving to
eliminate "important forms of competition among networks and
125. BROADCASTING, Jan. 16, 1984, at 102. ABC has already reported that it will
charge $525,000 for 30-second spots to be aired during the 1985 Super Bowl. BROADCASTING, Nov. 28, 1983, at 7.
126. Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1983, at 31, col. I. Projected audience share is a major factor
in setting prices for television ads. Thus, the major networks are able to charge significantly higher prices than their competitors. Compare the cost for a 30-second commercial
aired on ESPN, an all-sports cable network, which ranges from $250 to $2000 depending
on time and program. Friedman, Capsule Guide to Cable Networks, MADISON AVE., Jan.
1983, at 123.
127. One commentator suggests that the demand for television advertising initially is
highly elastic (very sensitive to changes in price), but only to a point where the advantages
of substituting other media for television continue to have utility. R. NOLL, M. PECK & J.
McGOWAN, supra note 50, at 34. The only example of this substitution effect occurred
when the government banned television advertising of cigarettes in 1971. Approximately
63% of the $211 million spent on television advertising in 1970 was shifted to other media
in 1971. The remaining 37% was accounted for in reduced advertising expenses. BROADCASTING, Jan. 24, 1972, at 40.
128. Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1983, at 31, col. 1. Procter & Gamble, a diverse manufacturer
of mass-market consumer products, spends over $400 million a year in advertising on network television. Id. In 1982, the five largest television advertisers were Procter & Gamble
(spending $576.9 million), General Foods ($303.2 million), General Mills ($201.3 million),
American Home Products ($197.5 million), and General Motors ($191.5 million). Wall St.
J., Mar. 31, 1983, at 31, col. 1.
129. See supra note 17.
130. 536 F. Supp. at 158. Standardization agreements are agreements among horizontal competitors to standardize their products. See id. at 159. Such agreements are not per
se violations of the Sherman Act; their effect on competition is analyzed with respect to the
structure of the industry involved and the degree of market development therein. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 277-79 (1977).

[Vol. 34:465

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

stations both for advertisers and for viewers." ''

Together with

the Code's time standards, the program interruption standards
prevented a station from designating hours for commercial-free
32 or from staggering commercials in "odd-lot"
programming
3
3

sizes. 1
Given the reach and market penetration of the three major
networks, 134 the Code's program interruption standards amount to
an interfirm product agreement among the networks. 35 The con-

centrated nature of the television industry, 136 coupled with the in-

teraction of Code program interruption and time standards, has
served to maintain the high price of prime time network advertis131. 536 F. Supp. at 158-59.
132. Id. at 159 n.37. This provision ultimately worked to the detriment of Code subscribers by spurring viewer demand for commercial-free programming. Mink, Why the
Networks Will Survive Cable, ATL. MONTHLY, Dec. 1983, at 63. Viewers were thus induced
to subscribe to "pay cable" services such as Home Box Office and the Movie Channel. Id.
133. Members of the advertising community suggest, however, that the networks may
object to odd-sized commercials, since they would disrupt the overall timing and sequencing of programs and complicate program editing. Friedman, supra note 108, at 38. Most
commercials are currently produced and sold in 30- or 60-second blocks. 0. KLEPPNER,
supra note 75, at 142; Miller Interview, supra note 75. Even if a firm with a large advertising budget wished to produce a five-minute commercial, the networks would discourage
such an ad for fear of disrupting program sequence. Sequencing is especially sensitive
during prime time-which is precisely when the advertiser would most want its commercial
aired. Such an expensive marketing ploy could only be justified if displayed during a period of maximum exposure.
Advertisers are gradually beginning to experiment with odd-sized commercials. A 90second ad for British Airways was hailed as an artistic success and found to be substantially more effective than three separate 30-second spots. Koten, Coca-Cola Turns to
Pavlov, Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1984, at 31, col. 1.
134. In 1979, it was estimated that 99.9% of all homes wired for electricity had black
and white television sets and that 89.8% had color sets. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES

766 table

1384

(102d ed. 1981).
135. Levin, supra note 96, at 635.
136. Concentration of market share in the three major networks, coupled with their
extensive reach, see supra note 134, makes the television industry a three-firm oligopoly at
the national level. S. LONG, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TELEVISION NETWORK OLIGOP-

OLY 61-69, 112-23 (1979). An industry can be structurally classified as an oligopoly if its
biggest firms hold market shares large enough so "that they will recognize the interaction
of their own behavior and their rivals' response in determining the values of the market
variables." Id. at 61. One commentator has described the concentration of power in the
three networks as a triopoly possessing all the characteristics of monopoly power. See B.
LITMAN, THE VERTICAL STRUCTURE OF THE TELEVISION BROADCAST INDUSTRY: THE

COALESCENCE OF POWER 24-28 (1979).
This high concentration of power, together with the coordinating nature of the NAB,
prompted the Justice Department to examine the NAB Code for anticompetitive effects.
Interview with Kenneth C. Anderson, former Chief of the Special Regulated Industries
Section of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 18,

1982) [hereinafter cited as Anderson Interview].
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ing. This has occurred through a continuing restriction on the
supply of advertising time that has never been accompanied by a
corresponding decrease in demand.' 37 Even if they do not constitute price fixing, the NAB Code's Advertising Standards indirectly
result in greater advertising revenues for the three major
networks.
3. Multiple Product Standard
The Code's multiple product standard, which barred advertisers from promoting two products within a single thirty-second
139

spot,

38

was deemed a per se violation of the Sherman Act.

Under the multiple product standard, said the court, "if [an advertiser] wishes to promote more than one item, he must purchase at
least sixty seconds of time-twice as much as he may actually
want or need."'40 Thus, the standard artificially stimulated deboth the price of
mand for commercial time, thereby increasing
4
time and the revenues of broadcasters.' '
To any firm compelled by the nature of its product or by industry marketing practices to rely on television advertising, this
standard imposed a formidable burden. 42 But its impact was especially severe on smaller firms, which were precluded from using
any portion of a thirty-second spot to launch or expose a second
143
product whose sales did not justify a commercial of its own.
Thus, the standard discriminated in favor of larger, "deep pocket"
concerns capable of financing longer commercials to advertise
several products per spot.'" Consequently, "[tielevision advertising [reduced] competition by creating a cost barrier to firms in
137. Had the court concluded that the program interruption and time standards exerted
more than a de minimis effect on the price of advertising time, the standards would have
been deemed violative of the Sherman Act. 536 F. Supp. at 157-58. A finding of de
minimis effect means that price is set essentially by other, neutral factors-type of programming, day of the week, time of day, audience size and demographics, or marketing
strategy of the particular advertiser. Id. However, even if these factors were found to
influence price, the Code would still have been held to violate the antitrust laws if its anticompetitive effect was more than de minimis. Id. at 158. Ultimately, the court held that
the issue could not be resolved on summary judgment, and left the determination for the
trial court. Id.
138. See supra note 18.
139. 536 F. Supp. at 163.
140. Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1983, at 3 1, col. 1; see Complaint at 34-39, Alberto-Culver Co.
v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, No. 83-3427 (D.D.C. dismissed Mar. 12, 1984).
143. 536 F. Supp. at 160.
144. Id.
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industries that depend on advertising."1 45 In an unrestricted market, advertisers would be free to allocate their resources in a more
cost-effective manner by promoting several complementary products in a single commercial spot.146 A fatal attribute of the multiple product standard was its coercive nature, giving the advertiser
no option but to accede to its demand. 47 But in the wake of the
government's antitrust suit, and a settlement between the three
major networks and Alberto-Culver Co.,' 4 8 advertisers now appear to enjoy a variety of options.
B. Antitrust Law and the Federal Communications Commission
49
While the FCC is not empowered to decide antitrust issues, 1
50
the antitrust laws apply directly to the broadcasting industry.
FCC regulation does not prevent federal courts from enforcing
the antitrust laws, since they retain jurisdiction to decide antitrust
issues regardless of confficting Commission action.'-" Several
courts have suggested that the Commission consider possible anticompetitive factors in its decisions.' 5 2 Although the Commission
may consider whether a competitive restraint violates the public
interest standard, one commentator has noted:
In antitrust policy the relevant factors are so numerous, the policy choices so complex, and the impact so broad that the ulti145. R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. MCGOWAN, supra note 50, at 39.
146. 536 F. Supp. at 161 n.46.
147. In the Alberto-Culver suit, see supra note 98, several multiproduct commercials
submitted by plaintiff to each of the three networks had been rejected. Although the NAB
Code had been discarded, the networks based their rejection on standards contained in
their own codes. Complaint at 17, Alberto-Culver. Both ABC and NBC have stopped adhering to these provisions and have negotiated with Alberto-Culver to allow the purchase
of multiproduct commercial spots. Id.; see BROADCASTING, Dec. 5, 1983, at 39. AlbertoCulver reached an out-of-court agreement with CBS on Feb. 3, 1984 whereby CBS agreed
to accept Alberto-Culver's two-product, 30-second commercials, subject to their conformance with the network's qualitative standards. Settlement Agreement at 3, Alberta-Culver.
Alberto-Culver dismissed the suit against all parties on Mar. 12, 1984 after the defendants
dropped their restrictions against split 30-second commercials ("split-30's"). BROADCASTING, Mar. 19, 1984, at 42.
Split-30's have been the subject of debate among broadcasters, advertisers, and ad
agency executives. Most agree, however, that squeezing two messages into one 30-second
spot contributes to clutter. BROADCASTING, Jan. 9, 1984, at 121; see supra note 75; cf.
BROADCASTING, Mar. 5, 1984, at 57 (critics fear "tidal wave" of split-30's).
148. See supra note 147.
149. United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 339-46 (1959).
150. See 47 U.S.C. § 313 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (providing for refusal or revocation of
license for antitrust violation).
151. RCA, 358 U.S. at 346.
152. See, e.g., id. at 351-52; General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 857 (5th
Cir. 1971).
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mate decision should rest with a decisionmaker who is without
overt institutional bias and who is in a position to balance the
multiplicity of competing interests. The courts [are] better

regulatory agencies, each of which
suited for this task than.
is affected by the limited perspective of the industry under its
protective jurisdiction.'
The public interest standard has become a "battleground for
broadcasting's regulatory debate."' 54 Whereas the FCC has
found the public interest to require diversity of programming'

and prevention of overcommercialization, 56 Congress, through
the antitrust laws, has identified a prominent public interest in
free and fair competition.'" 7 Unprecedented developments in television technology and the subsequent obsolescence of the scar-

city rationale have raised questions about the effectiveness of
industry self-regulation and its impact on potential competition in
the video marketplace. The burgeoning new video media will

compete increasingly with broadcast television for its audience
and for the advertisers who finance its operation. With the advent
of deregulation, competitive forces in the market offer the most
promising means of checking overcommercialization. Thus, the
goal of the antitrust laws can be viewed as complementing, rather
than contradicting, the goals of the Communications Act: the

public interest in preventing overcommercialization could conceivably be served by promoting the public interest in free
competition.
III.

MARKET DISCIPLINE AS THE NEW ALTERNATIVE

The demise of the NAB Code leaves television advertising

time subject to containment by natural competitive forces in the
153. Shuman, supra note 78, at 42.
154. E. KRASNOW, L. LONGLEY & H. TERRY,Supra note 12, at 16. Some commentators

have taken the position that the FCC has performed inadequately in interpreting the public
interest standard. See, e.g., Chamberlin, Lessons in Regulating Information Row: The
FCC's Weak Track Record in Interpretingthe Public Interest Standard, 60 N.C.L. REv.
1057 (1982); Robinson, The FederalCommunications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory
Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REv. 169, 193-96 (1978).
155. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 594-96 (1981). An examination of

current programming, however, reveals the prevalence of nondiverse, mass-market programming. S. LONG, supra note 136, at 13-14.
156. See Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 1000-02, recon. grantedinpart,87
F.C.C.2d 797 (1981), af'din part, remandedin partsub nom. Office of Communication of

the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
157. See National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978).
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marketplace. Ideally, market discipline 158 will determine the appropriate level of advertising through competition among broadcasters and substitute media for the greatest audience share. 159
Advocates of market discipline assert that competition alone will
60
make overcommercialization self-defeating for the broadcaster.
As one proponent has aptly stated, "The viewer always retains ultimate control over what enters his home; he may choose to turn the
channel."' 6' Thus, the threat of an eroding audience share should
force broadcasters to resist overcommercialization. 6 The market
discipline approach is particularly attractive because market
forces react 63
more swiftly and efficiently to a change in viewer
preferences. 1
A.

Obsolescence of the Previous Regulatory Scheme

The previous regulatory framework cast the licensee in the
role of public trustee acting under government guidance, with the
obligation to exercise "a diligent, positive and continuing effort
. . . to discover and fulfill the tastes, needs and desires of his service area."' 6 The licensee's trustee role stemmed from the exclusivity of the government grant: a position on the limited broadcast
spectrum. License assignment and renewal were based on the
public interest standard. 65 But this approach to regulation underestimated the influence of competition on the licensee's behavior.
In NBC v. United States, Justice Frankfurter used the spectrum scarcity rationale to support his endorsement of the FCC's
broad authority to regulate in the "public interest."'' 66 He noted,
however, that "[i]f time and changing circumstances reveal that
the 'public interest' is not served by application of the Regula158. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 180-216 and accompanying text.
160. Anderson Interview, supra note 136; see also Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d at 1002-05 (discussing role of market forces in eliminating commercial guidelines for radio).
161. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 20, at 229 (emphasis added); see Abrams, supra note
77.
162. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
163. Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d at 1095. But see R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. McGOWAN, supra
note 50, at 20-57 (suggesting that basic market imperfections prevent expression of real
viewer preferences).
164. En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2312 (1960); see Fowler & Brenner, supra note 20, at 213-17.
165. 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
166. 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943). "The facilities of radio are limited and therefore precious; they cannot be left to wasteful use without detriment to the public interest." Id. at
216.
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tions, it must be assumed that the Commission will act in accordance with its statutory obligations."' 67 Time and changing
circumstances have indeed raised doubts about the continued vitality of the scarcity rationale, which was formulated when broadcasting was in its infancy. Although television was a technological
reality when the Communications Act was adopted, its drafters
could never have predicted the revolutionary effect it would have
on society.' 68 The growing size and complexity of the television
industry have left the scarcity rationale outdated and the Act in
69
urgent need of revision.'

Cable television's increasing market penetration

70

and popu-

7
larity have helped render the scarcity rationale obsolete.'1
Cable's rapid growth has made it an increasingly attractive medium for advertisers. 72 Indeed, the advance of cable has been

167. Id. at 225.
168. No one in 1934 could have predicted that broadcast income for the total television
industry in 1980 would be $1.65 billion. STANDARD & POOR'S CORP., INDUSTRY SURVEYS:
COMMUNICATION CURRENT ANALYSIS 64 (1982) [hereinafter cited as INDUSTRY SURVEYS].
169. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. See generally E. KRASNOW, L. LONGLEY & H. TERRY, supra note 12, at 240-70 (summarizing congressional efforts to rewrite the
Communications Act).
170. Cable currently reaches 39% of all American homes. Mink, supra note 132, at 64
(based on Nielsen figures). Industry analysts are predicting that cable will achieve market
penetration of 50% to 60% by 1990. 0 & M Projects Cable Reaching6075 in '90, ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 15, 1980, at 56, col. 4.
171. Spectrum scarcity is a principle that is technologically inapplicable to cable television. Cable distributes its signals by wire; it does not utilize the spectrum to transmit its
signal. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 20, at 226; D. RIcE, M. BOTEIN & E. SAMUELS,
DEVELOPMENT AND REGULATION OF NEW COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 9 (1980).

The standard cable system uses a tower with antennas to receive broadcast television
signals. Id. at 10. Some signals are relayed by microwave transmission. Id. at 10 n.42.
These signals then are connected by coaxial cable from the antennas to the "headend"
facility, which is the "'master control station and nerve center' of the cable system." The
headend processes these signals, often by translating them from a carrier signal (high frequency signal sent through the air and then modulated by a lower signal) to a standard
television broadcast signal which corresponds to a channel. Once it is received by the
microwave link, the desired television signal must first be demodulated (removed from the
microwave transmission carrier). After filtering out unwanted signals, all signals are combined into one composite signal and then amplified prior to their distribution through the
cable system. Id. at 10 n.43. The cable distribution network then carries these processed
and amplified signals to the television sets of subscribers. Id. at 10 n.44. This is accomplished through a system of trunk cables which carry the signals from the headend, and
feeder cables which carry the signals from the trunk cable to a drop cable connected to the
subscriber's home. Id. at 10-1 1 nn.44-45.
172. INDUSTRY SURVEYS, supra note 168, at 62. Cable industry advertising revenues
exceeded $382 million in 1983, a 58.4% increase over 1982 figures. The Cable Advertising
Bureau projects revenues of $576 million for 1985. BROADCASTING, Jan. 30, 1984, at 64.
But see Mink, supra note 132, at 65-66 (increase in advertising revenues for cable television
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accompanied by a decline in the networks' audience share. 173

Another deficiency of television regulation is its failure to account for technological developments.' 74 The 1980's are expected
to bring further competition to over-the-air television from directbroadcast satellites (DBS). 175 Already the FCC is investigating
the possibilities of low-power television, 176 which can transmit sig-

nals in areas as small as ten percent of a typical service area, thus
providing service in areas too small for profitable operation of a
full-power station. 7 7 Multipoint distribution service (MDS), 17 8
another source of competition, transmits signals on microwave

frequencies without utilizing the conventional broadcast spectrum. These new sources of programming have further contributed to the scarcity rationale's obsolescence.
Competition in the video marketplace will acquire an entirely
new meaning in the coming decade. With the wide array of available broadcasting services, the real scarcity in the near future may
be a scarcity of programming and advertising dollars.179 Thus,
the industry which Congress set out to regulate in 1934 has
changed beyond recognition; fundamental principles upon which
the Communications Act is based-such as the scarcity rationale-no longer reflect reality. The existing statutory system can no
longer function as an effective regulatory model.
B.

The Effect of Competition on Potential
Overcommercialization

The elimination of commercial guidelines should not imply
has neither been as great nor as rapid as initially forecast, causing some cable channels to
reduce programming).
173. INDUSTRY SURVEYS, supra note 168, at 65; Mink, supra note 132, at 63.
174. Ferris, Direct Broadcast Satellites: 4 Pieceof the Video Puzzle, 33 FED. COM. L.J.
169, 172-76 (1981). FCC Chairman Mark Fowler has described technology as "an independent variable that makes scarcity a relative concept." Fowler & Brenner, supra note
20, at 222.
175. Ferris, supra note 174, at 174-76.
176. See Inquiry into the Future Role of Low-Power Television Broadcasting and Television Translators in the National Telecommunications System, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,468
(1982).
177. Ferris, supra note 174, at 172. Low-power television also can be used to broadcast
to segmented audiences or special interest groups in urban areas without interfering with
conventional stations' broadcasts. Id.
178. Id. at 173. MDS was originally intended for use in hotels, apartments, and resort
facilities, but has been used regularly in private homes as a substitute for cable. Id. See
Deregulation of Television, supra note 34, at 37,244.
179. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 20, at 223; Pridgen & Engel, supra note 86, at
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government approval of a disproportionate ratio of advertising to
programming time. "A marketplace approach to broadcast regulation.

. .

emphasizes the role of new competitors, and new com-

petition among existing firms, to ensure service in the public
interest."180 There must be a reasonable balance, however, between the FCC's goal of preventing overcommercialization and
the antitrust goal of promoting and preserving competition. 181 By
basing regulation on competition, 82market discipline seeks to
achieve both goals simultaneously.1
Protection of the public interest through reliance on competition in broadcasting received judicial endorsement as early as
1940.183 Distinguishing broadcasting from common carrier regulation, the Supreme Court in FCCv. SandersBrothersRadio Station
stated:
The Act recognizes that the field of broadcasting is one of free
competition. The sections dealing with broadcasting demonstrate that Congress has not, in its regulatory scheme, abandoned the principle of free competition.... Plainly it is not
a licensee against competition
the purpose of the Act to protect
4
but to protect the public. 8
Reaction to new competition in the video marketplace from the
viewing audience, advertisers, and individual licensees should
provide adequate safeguards in maintaining acceptable levels of
advertising.
1. The New Competition
As consumers of the products and services advertised on television, viewers are television's indirect financiers. Rapidly growing alternatives to over-the-air television have already begun to
compete for viewers and advertising dollars. One favorable effect
of eliminating commercial guidelines for television is the greater
flexibility afforded broadcasters to compete with these new media.
a. Cable Television. Cable television stands as the leading rival of traditional television broadcasting. Cable's increased channel capacity 8 5 has created the availability of diverse, segmented
programming. Specialty channels now offer all-news, all-sports,
180. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 20, at 231.

181. Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 42 n.73 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
182.
183.
184.
185.

See supra text following note 157.
See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
Id. at 474-75.
A single coaxial cable can deliver up to 64 channels, compared to a limited coexis-
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music videos, health news, and arts formats, along with program86
ming specifically tailored to blacks, Hispanics, and children.'
to
The booming growth of cable proves that viewers are willing
187

pay for more diverse and commercial-free programming.

Cable television is attracting increasing advertiser support for
its programming. 88 The medium possesses qualities distinct from
over-the-air television which may prove advantageous to certain
advertisers. 8 9 With its segmented, special interest programming,
cable permits advertisers to target specific markets with a precision impossible on network television. 190 This "narrowcasting"
affords the advertiser a more efficient means of promoting products or services, an efficiency enhanced by reduced overhead cable
advertising rates, which are substantially lower than those of
broadcast television. '' Cable's lower rates in turn allow greater
flexibility in the presentation and timing of commercials. Advertising on cable television also offers the opportunity for development of experimental formats and styles. Program-length
commercials,19 2 formerly barred from broadcast television by the
tence of seven VHF channels in a single community. Pridgen & Engel, supra note 86, at 229
n.10.
186. For a discussion of the various cable specialty channels, see Friedman, supra note
126, at 119-25.
187. Yet pay cable services face a major problem- their dependence on movies. The
supply of movies is limited, forcing the channels to repeat the same features several times
per month. The supply of high quality movies is even more limited. This results in frequent cancellation of pay services by customers who "don't feel they're getting their
money's worth. HBO . . . has a cancellation rate of 3 percent a month, or 36 percent a
year. The relatively new Playboy pay channel. . . admits to a desolating cancellation rate
of 78 percent a year." Mink, supra note 132, at 65.
188. Anheuser-Busch, for example, signed a five-year, $25 million advertising contract
with ESPN in 1980. AB Pours $25 Million Into ESPN Contract, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov.
3, 1980, at 4, col. 1. Bristol-Meyers has entered into a ten-year, $25 million contract to
sponsor health and science programs on the Cable News Network. Bronson, As Marketing
Tool of GreatPotential,Advertisers Begin to Look at Cable TV, Wall St. J., Dec. 26, 1979, at
11, col. I. This kind of support is vital to cable's survival. See Mink, supra note 132, at
65-66.
189. The qualities include multichannel capacity, lower advertising rates, longer formats, and the ability to employ "two-way" systems by which viewers may order items
offered for sale through video catalogues. Pridgen & Engel, supra note 86, at 231-34.
190. Id. at 232 n.31.
191. A 30-second prime time commercial on "superstation" WTBS in Atlanta ranges
from $1100 to $1800, compared with $50,000 to $150,000 for similar time slots on NBC,
ABC, and CBS. Cable TV Pitching Big-Spending Advertisers, ADVERTISING AGE, May 5,
1980, at 72, col. 1. But see Mink, supra note 132, at 66 ("[C]able's ad ratesperviewer 'are in
') (quoting
the stratosphere, and there is no good audience-measurement system ....
John S. Reidy, communications industry analyst for Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., an
investment banking firm) (emphasis added).
192. This type of advertising, known in the industry as an "informercial," would be
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FCC,193 may be uniquely suited to cable's segmented format and
94
lower advertising costs.'
b. Subscrption Television. Subscription television employs
the facilities of a conventional television station to transmit a
"coded" (scrambled) signal to individual dwellings. 95 A device is
then used to decode the scrambled signal to allow reception on
television receivers.' 96 This commerical-free broadcast service is
subsidized directly by subscribing viewers. 97
Subscription television's primary appeal is to those whose
communities have not yet been wired to receive cable television
signals.' 9 8 Although the service currently reaches a limited market, 99 subscription television companies expect to be operating
ninety stations by 1985, serving three million subscribers and generating revenues of $720 million annually." ° While not nearly as
formidable a competitor as cable, subscription television threatens
an additional drain on the audience shares of advertiser-supported network television."'
c. DirectBroadcast Satellite System. Although still in development, DBS will transmit programming directly to viewers by a
particularly valuable in educating consumers about functionally or technologically complex products such as computers and robots. Moreover, it would provide tremendous market exposure for an advertiser willing to invest in the time required to present its product in
such a format. See Brown,AdertisingandtheNew Media, CHANNELS, Mar./Apr. 1983, at
37; Pridgen & Engel, supra note 86, at 233; see also Beltramini, The Impact oflnformercials
Perspectives of Advertisers and Advertising Agencies, J. ADVERTISING RESEARCH, Aug./
Sept. 1983, at 25, 25-31 (research finding ad agency media directors and creative directors
to favor informercials).
193. See R. ELLMORE, supra note 70, at 238-39.
194. The prohibitive cost of advertising on broadcast television negates any incentive
for developing program-length commercials at the network level. Increased competition
from cable, however, has prompted test marketing of new advertising formats. See, eg.,
Koten, supra note 133, at 31, col. 1.
195. See Subscription Television, 15 F.C.C.2d 466, 472 (1966).
196. See Krattenmaker & Metzger, FCCRegulatoryAuthority Over CommericalTelevision Networks: The Role of Ancillary Jurisdiction,77 Nw. U.L. REv. 403, 474-75 (1982).
197. Id. at 474.
198. "[S]cattered populations in rural areas and the sheer cost of constructing some
systems may keep 20 percent of American homes from ever having access to cable carrying
video signals." Mink, supra note 132, at 64.
199. In 1980, subscription television was received by 400,000 homes in seven geographic markets. Krattenmaker & Metzger, supra note 196, at 474. In 1983, it was available on 20 American stations. Deregulation of Television, supra note 34, at 37,244.
200. BROADCAST NG, Apr. 7, 1980, at 46.
201. Krattenmaker & Metzger, supra note 196, at 479.
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system of communications satellites and home receiving units.20 2
The system employs technology similar to that used in conveying
programs to cable systems via satellite.2 °3 A dish-shaped antenna
outside the home ("earth station") receives satellite signals; another device converts the signals to permit reception on a standard
television set.2 1 One DBS service has proposed a three-channel
system offering a wide array of programming choices.20 5
The cost of DBS cannot be borne by subscribers alone and will
require advertising support. The system's broad geographic reach
should make it an attractive medium for advertisers with massmarketed national products. As with subscription television, the
most promising markets for DBS initially will be rural and central
city areas where cable is not yet available.20 6 Nevertheless, DBS
is likely to tap audience shares and advertising revenues presently
flowing to traditional broadcast television.
The video market has evolved to the point where close substitutes for conventional over-the-air television will soon be readily
available in most geographic areas. 20 7 The penetration of cable
television and rapid development of competitive alternatives has
increased the cross-elasticity of demand for advertising on traditional broadcast television. Demand should become even more
elastic with the advent of a functional DBS system and the increased encroachment of cable television upon the three networks'
audience shares.
2. Additional Safeguards
In its proceedings on radio deregulation, the FCC identified
three sources of market pressure that should inhibit commercial
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 479-80, 405 n.10.
205. This system, proposed by Satellite Television Corporation, envisions one channel
featuring movies, concerts, and theater, a second channel offering public affairs, children's
programs, and fine arts programming; and a third featuring sports, adult education, and
experimental theater. Note, Direct Broadcast Satellites: Ownership and Access to the New
Technology, 33 FED. COM. L.J. 245, 246 n.6 (1981); see also Landro, United Satellite Makes
Progressin Talks With Movie Studios, Cable-TVNetworks, Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1983, at 16,
col. 1 (specific plans of United Satellite Communications, Inc. include five-channel system
with sports, news, general interest, and two movie channels; proposed fees are $500 installation per home and $17.50 per month).
206. Ferris, supra note 174, at 175.
207. See Deregulation of Television, supra note 34, at 37,243-45 (assessing technologies which "may provide genuine substitutes in the viewer's mind for regular television
broadcasting").
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abuse: audiences, advertisers, and individual licensees. 20 8 The interaction of these groups should bear equally on enforcement of
market discipline in the television industry. Both viewers and advertisers are sensitive to commercial clutter.2 0 9 Viewers react to
clutter with an incapacity to differentiate among the various
messages. 210 They listen less attentively, retain less of the
message, and become annoyed by the incessant appeals.2 1' Thus,
clutter reduces return on investment for the advertiser, who must
pay the high price of television time.2 12
An advantage of market discipline is that it gives the audience
ultimate control over optimum advertising levels. With an increasing number of video programming alternatives, viewers can
select the channel that offers the most appealing ratio of programming to advertising. In an industry marked by fierce competition
for audience share and ratings, fear of losing an audience is of
paramount concern to the individual station. Thus, competition
provides the most effective means of regulation.2 1 3 Commercial
excess is likely to cause a decline in the viewing audience, resulting in lower ratings for the station and the particular program.
This should force advertisers, who have a vested interest in reaching the maximum target audience, to shift their commericals to
other stations. Thus, overcommercialization in a deregulated
market is self-defeating for the licensee who depends on advertiser
support.
Eliminating commercial guidelines and relying on market incentives also would allow advertisers to experiment with alternative forms of advertising presentation. 14 Both the public and
advertisers will benefit from development of more specialized advertisements and "informercials." More importantly, eliminating
the guidelines will not reduce the FCC's licensing authority under
208. Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 1007, recon. grantedin part, 87 F.C.C.2d
797 (1981), afd in part, remandedinpart sub non Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
209. See supra note 75.
210. Miller Interview, supra note 75; see Lazarus,.4 Super Waste of Money?, ADWEEK,
Feb. 7, 1983, at 8.
211. 0. KLEPPNER, supra note 75, at 127; cf. Abrams, supra note 77 (viewers "zap"
commercials with remote control devices).
212. Regardless of audience size, advertisers have grown concerned about the impact of
commercials aired during any show "clogged with pitches." Lazarus, supra note 210, at 8.
213. Anderson Interview, supra note 136; see BROADCASTING, June 18, 1979, at 27.
214. See Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d at 1007; Sf. Koten, supra note 133 (90-second
commercials).
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the public interest standard.
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The Commission must still con-

sider a totality of factors during the license issuance and renewal
process to determine whether a particular station has met its public service obligations.21 6 Commercial excess may be one such
factor.
Changes in the nature of the television product have compelled a reexamination of regulation in this dynamic industry.
This, in turn, poses new challenges for controlling television advertising to safeguard against abuse. Reliance on market discipline to contain commercial excess will afford broadcast television
the flexibility to compete with the new video media while providing a more accurate gauge of public preferences.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Eliminating television advertising standards is a positive step
for the future of broadcasting. Previous regulation by the government and the NAB has tended to fabricate" 'artificial scarcity and
inflated prices.' ",217 The emergence of new alternatives to traditional broadcast television has reshaped the competitive nature of
the industry. Furthermore, the judiciary has endorsed encouragement of competition in broadcasting and reliance on market
218
forces to serve the public interest.
Self-regulation of advertising has always been promoted in the
television industry. 2 19 The increasing market penetration of cable
television and the development of new forms of broadcasting
technology have resulted in greater cross-elasticity of demand for
television advertising time. 220 Moreover, interaction among audi215. The consent decree only mandated elimination of the NAB Code's Advertising
Standards, which were the subject of the government's antitrust suit. See supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
216. The FCC's decision to deregulate broadcast television eliminated ascertainment
and logging requirements for commercial television licensees. See Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, supranote 34, at 33,588 & 33,596-97 & 33,599-601.
Thus, citizens will find it more difficult to review a licensee's performance to assess whether
their interests are being served. See BROADCASTING, July 2, 1984, at 31-32. The elimination of logging requirements may increase the administrative difficulty and costs for the
FCC to detect the occurrence of a market failure, or to intervene if overcommercialization
ensues. But see Berger, supranote 34, at 24, cols. 2-3 (broadcasting and advertising executives do not expect increase in commercials broadcast per hour).
217. Ferris, supra note 174, at 170 n.3.
218. See, e.g., FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 595-98 (1981); FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1940).
219. See Ramey, supra note 58, at 85.
220. See supra notes 185-207 and accompanying text.
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ences, advertisers, and the price of advertising time would create a
regulatory system capable of reacting swiftly and efficiently to correct commercial excess.22 1 Market discipline will better serve the
public interest because the market directly reflects viewer preferences and tolerances regarding the appropriate level of television
advertising.
Resort to market discipline as a regulatory scheme does not
preclude the FCC from intervening in the event of market failure. 222 Nor does it preclude the FCC from conducting hearings or
issuing notices of inquiry or policy statements when it identifies a
potential threat to the public interest. 223 The FCC retains its licensing authority to review the practices of individual licensees to
determine the level of their public service.22 4 In addition, networks and individual stations are free to implement their own
guidelines.2 2 5
The effects of the decision to abolish the NAB Code cannot be
assessed until the industry has had time to adjust. But elimination
of the Code may serve as a prod to expedite review and revision of
the Communications Act so that it may be rendered more responsive to technological change in this volatile industry. Finally, the
reliance on market forces may help to provide greater programming diversity on conventional over-the-air television.
DEAN

K. CHERCHIGLIA

221. See supra notes 208-16 and accompanying text.
222. The FCC could act pursuant to its authority to "[m]ake such rules and regulations
and prescribe such restrictions and conditions... as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act .... " 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
223. Neither does it overturn judicial decisions on the issue of commercial excess. E.g.,
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
224. This may prove an empty process since stations are no longer required, as they
had been under the NAB Code, to keep program logs or records to show compliance with
specific standards.
225. These guidelines, however, must not contain provisions similar to the NAB Code's
Advertising Standards that prompted the government's antitrust suit; otherwise, the individual stations could face similar litigation. See, e.g., Complaint at 11-13, Alberto-Culver
Co. v. National Ass'n of Advertisers, No. 83-3427 (D.D.C. dismissed Mar. 12, 1984).

